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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-GIFT OF LAND "FOR USE BY WHITE RACE
ONLY" CREATES POSSIBILITY OF REvERTER FOR VIOLATION.-D do-
nated land to P for use as a park, subject to the restriction that the
land was for use by the white race only. The deed provided for a
reverter to the grantor upon failure to comply with the restriction.
Negroes demanded the right to use the park. In a declaratory
judgment action, P seeks determination of the validity of the restric-
tion and reverter clause in the deed. Held, affirming judgment,
that the deed created a valid fee simple determinable; that use by
non-whites would cause the estate granted to revert automatically
to the grantor; and further, that since the reverter operated auto-
matically, requiring no judicial enforcement, the constitutional
rights of Negroes were not violated. Charlotte Park and Recreation
Comm'n v. Barringer, 88 S.E.2d 114 (N.C. 1955).
The question here is whether the decision is a denial by the
state of the equal protection of the laws, guaranteed by the four-
teenth amendment of the United States Constitution. The court's
reasoning that the automatic reverter is not such a denial, is open
to question. It is true that the possibliity of reverter takes effect
automatically upon the happening of the condition or event named
in the creating instrument. 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 4.12
(Casner ed. 1952). However, a decision subsequent to the principal
case raised another question. In Dawson v. Mayor and City Coun-
cil of Baltimore, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955), aff'd without opinion,
24 U.S.L. Week 3125 (U.S. Nov. 7, 1955), the Supreme Court af-
firmed a holding that racial segregation in public recreational ac-
tivities can no longer be sustained as a proper exercise of the police
power. Thus a public agency, such as the plaintiff in the instant
case, cannot refuse to allow Negroes the use of a park. The holding
in the principal case is that use by the Negroes would cause a
reverter to the grantor. But if the grantee resists being dispossessed
the grantor or his heirs must bring some possessory action to regain
possession. See Powell, Determinable Fees, 23 COLUm. L. REv. 207
(1923). If possession is then regained through judicial process,
the court would be indirectly aiding a discriminatory provision in a
deed. Such a result would be illogical, to say the least, for the
right to use the park has been given directly; it should not be taken
away indirectly.
It is difficult to draw analogies from decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, for "the Court will not formulate a rule of
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constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is to be applied." Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347
(1936) (concurring opinion). However, over a period of time,
certain trends can be observed. This is particularly true in cases of
the denial of equal rights to Negroes. In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954), holding segregation in District of Columbia schools a de-
nial of due process under the fifth amendment, the Court said:
"Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which the
individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a
proper governmental objective." Id. at 499. Segregation in state
schools solely on the basis of race denies the equal protection of laws
under the fourteenth amendment. Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1953). The Dawson case, supra, extended this doctrine to
the field of public recreation facilities. The holding of the principal
case would seem to be in conflict with the spirit of the above cases.
But in Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d
541 (1949), a refusal to admit Negroes as tenants in a housing pro-
ject was allowed. The opinion said that the refusal was private,
not state, action, despite the fact that the state had given the de-
fendant tax exemptions and other aid. The Supreme Court denied
certiorari, 339 U.S. 981 (1950), two Justices being of the opinion
that certiorari should be granted. The denial in such an "im-
portant" case has been questioned. Harper and Rosenthal, An
Appraisal of Certiorari, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 293 (1950).
Two decisions of the Supreme Court concerning property re-
strictions contain language that appears to have some bearing on
the question posed by the principal case. In Shelley v. Kraeiner,
334 U.S. 1 (1948), it was held that restrictive covenants as to race
are not enforceable by injunction. The Court said that while the
making of such agreements was lawful, the enforcement of them
by the state deprived non-Caucasians of the equal protection of
the laws. The opinion in the instant case dismissed Shelley v.
Kraemer as having no application. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S.
249 (1953), held that damages are not recoverable for violation of
restrictive racial covenants. The Court said "To compel . . . [de-
fendant] to respond in damages would be for the State to punish
her for failure to perform her covenant to continue to discriminate
against non-Caucasians. . . . The result of that sanction by the
State would be to encourage the use of restrictive covenants." Id.
at 254. The decision in the principal case reaches a result similar
to that which the Supreme Court has rejected; i.e., the park officials
must continue to discriminate against Negroes, which they can no
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longer lawfully do, or else lose the property. As mentioned above,
such a result would be illogical. But by taking the doctrine of the
Shelley and Barrows cases one step further, it might be said that
the determination by a state court that such a reverter is valid, is
state action which denied equal protection of the laws to persons
within its jurisdiction. Such reasoning is not illogical when com-
pared with the progress toward equalization of all persons, within
the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. If the above arguments
are valid, the holding of the principal case would not be sustained,
on appeal, or in a subsequent action.
C. M. C.
COURTS-CONSTRUCTION OF LOCAL STATUTE BY FOREIGN COURT-
SURVIVAL OF CRIMINAL ACTION AFTER CoRoRATE DISSOLUTION.-The
United States was prosecuting D corporation and three of its sub-
sidiaries X, Y, and Z, for violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
§§ 1, 2, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, (1946), in conspiring
to fix prices, and to monopolize sales. After the filing of the infor-
mation X dissolved pursuant to the laws of West Virginia, its in-
corporating state, and Y and Z merged with D corporation, pursuant
to the laws of their incorporating states, Delaware and New York.
D moved to dismiss the information as to such subsidiaries on the
ground that they were no longer in existence. Held, motion granted,
the law of the incorporating state governs the effect to be given to
the merger or dissolution of a corporation, and none of the states
of incorporation has statutes abrogating the common law principle
that criminal actions against corporations abate upon dissolution
or merger. United States v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 132
F. Supp. 388 (D. Col. 1955).
Is the federal court's construction binding on our own state
courts? Prior decisions leave no room for doubt that our local
courts can place their own constructions on the statute without
considering the interpretation placed on it by the federal courts.
Union Pacific R.R. v. Weld County, 247 U.S. 282, 287 (1917). In
Johnson v. Jordan, 22 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. Okla. 1938), where a
federal court had construed a state statute, and the state court later
had placed a different construction on it, the federal court was now
confronted with the question of which construction is was bound
to follow. The court ruled that "[aJfter a contrary construction
by the state court of last resort, it being a matter peculiarly within
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